

FORMATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE ALLIED BODY – EUROPEAN ADVISORY COMMISSION IN 1943–1945. (BRIEF SURVEY BASED ON THE UNITED STATES' ARCHIVE DOCUMENTS)

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World War II, its reasons, development, as well as a variety of diplomatic negotiations among its main representatives, has been extensively covered by historians. However, at first glance less attention is substantially paid to marginal issues that comprise the existence and operation of an important allied body, the European Advisory Commission. During its operation, lasting longer than one and a half years, this body elaborated a number of principle documents, serving as a basis for the post-war organisation of Europe. The efforts of the main representatives of the United States of America, Great Britain and the Soviet Union concerning the establishment of a common consultative body occurred shortly after the Allies entered the war against Nazi Germany. The commission gradually developed into its final shape, and its establishment was connected to the Allies' plans with regard to the governing of Italy after its unconditional surrender. A significant position of the European Advisory Commission is proved by the fact that the materials completed on its grounds were submitted and approved at two big conferences, held in 1945. The results achieved at Yalta and Potsdam significantly influenced a further development of all of Europe for several decades.

The advance of Allied military operations in 1943 and the expected defeat of the Axis powers drew attention to the problem of the formation of a mechanism, which would assure a closer co-operation between the U.S.A., the Soviet Union and Great Britain that would solve European issues, resulting from the war development. In summer 1943, the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs elaborated a document entitled *Suggested Principles Which Would Govern the Conclusion of Hostilities with the European Members of the Axis*, submitted to American and Soviet governments for reviewing on 14th July. The plan, above all, aimed at solving the then-current question – an expected capitulation of Italy. The document included the first reference to the establishment of an inter-allied tripartite commission, authorised to

supervise the conditions of truce, to be abided by, after its call. Apart from this, the British party required the establishment of another controlling body, which was called The United Nations Commission for Europe. The role of this body was defined on a very general level – the commission was to manage and co-ordinate the activities of the allied control commissions, commanders-in-chief and all those subjects who were entitled to influence the European-wide issues. Despite the fact that the members of the commission could have been other countries, the governance of this body was to remain fully in the hands of the representatives of the Big Three.¹

As a result, Moscow understood from the British document that the Western powers were inviting the Soviet Union to co-govern post-war Italy. The American party did not protest against this interpretation, quite the opposite. The ambassador of the U.S.A. in Moscow, William Standley, conveyed to Secretary of State Cordell Hull that everything that was happening in connection with Italy had an extremely huge significance for further allied co-operation. In his opinion, the United States was to act in this issue in such a way that the Soviet party could not get, in any case, the impression that the Americans held “an insufficiently co-operative attitude”.²

The British document was grasped by Soviet leader Josef V. Stalin and, on 22nd August 1943, in his letters to American President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill proposed the establishment of a military-political commission, which would “judge questions concerning negotiations with different governments falling out with Germany”.³ The main motivational factor was the fact that despite promises to the contrary, Moscow was not satisfied with the level of information concerning Anglo-American negotiations with Italy – the details of the negotiations on the possibility of signing capitulation were provided to the Soviet party later. Stalin ceased to play a role of a passive observer, who, in his opinion, was given incomplete pieces of information, and therefore he proposed to establish a common tripartite commission. However, Roosevelt responded by a counter-proposal – to delegate a Soviet officer to participate in the decision making in General Eisenhower’s staff. The American party, similarly to the Soviet party, principally did not refuse the British proposal related to adding another member, this time a French delegate. Nevertheless, the

¹ *Foreign relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers, 1943. General Volume I.* Washington, D. C. 1963 (further only *FRUS 1943*), pp. 708–710.

² KUKLICK, Bruce: *The Genesis of the European Advisory Commission*. In: *Journal of Contemporary History* (The Great Depression), Vol. No. 4, (Oct. 1969), p. 191.

³ *FRUS 1943*, p. 782.

President expressed his conviction that, in his opinion, it would not be wise to integrate the French into the direct negotiations about Italy, because “On the whole, the Italians dislike the French greatly, and if we bring the French into occupation discussions, the civil and military elements in Italy will resent it extremely.”⁴ Therefore, the position of a French representative in the commission should not be equal to other three members. Roosevelt firmly refuses both de Gaulle’s French Committee of National Liberation to act at the same level as the governments of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States and the French delegate’s participation in the negotiations with regard to “all the issues”.⁵

Stalin considered Roosevelt’s proposal related to sending a Soviet representative to work in General Eisenhower’s as insufficient, and urged the establishment of the mentioned commission with its residence in Sicily. On 27 August, Churchill informed Roosevelt that the British government approved the establishment of the commission. However, he required that the body would not reside on the Italian territory as Stalin had proposed, but it would be situated in a less accessible Algeria, where the allied main parties resided. Stalin accepted the British objection, but preferred re-location of the commission on the territory of Italy sometimes later.⁶ As the American party did not raise any objections, in principle all three parties agreed upon the establishment of the Political-Military Commission with its residence in Algiers.⁷ The Soviet Union proposed the representative of the people’s commissar of foreign affairs, Andrej Vyshinsky as their delegate. He was a highly-positioned official – those times he was considered the third most powerful man in the hierarchical structure of the Soviet diplomacy, following Stalin and the head of diplomacy, Vyacheslav Molotov. Great Britain was to be represented in the commission by the ministerial resident of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force in Europe, Harold Macmillan. At the same time the British party assumed that the United States would be represented by Roosevelt’s special envoy in Northern Africa – Robert Murphy, but on 28th September the President unexpectedly appointed Edwin Wilson,

⁴ Roosevelt’s letter to Stalin from 6th September 1943. *FRUS 1943*, p. 784; *Korešpondencia predsedu Rady ministrov ZSSR s prezidentmi USA a ministerskými predsedami V. Británie za Velkej vlasteneckej vojny 1941 – 1945. (The correspondence of the Chairman of the Soviet Council of People’s Commissars with the President of the U.S.A. and the Prime Minister of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War in 1941–1945)*. Bratislava 1983, pp. 518–519.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 532.

⁶ *FRUS 1943*, pp. 782–786.

⁷ The Allied statesmen used different names in terms of the commission, such as the *Politico Military Commission*, *Military Political Commission*, sometimes *Mediterranean Commission*.

the then American ambassador in Panama.⁸ This step was a clear signal to the Soviet party that Western powers did not attach great importance to the commission as Moscow wished.

During October, other complications occurred. Despite the agreement between the representatives of the Soviet Union, the U.S.A. and Great Britain on the Political-Military Commission that it would consist of three members, a participation in it was gradually applied by other states, but not only by European ones such as Yugoslavia and Greece, but beyond Europe, for example, China or Brazil. The British and Americans did not want to strictly exclude the representation of other countries, but a criterion of selection for participation in the commission was an immediate participation of the country in the war against Italy. In this aspect, the Soviet party accepted the attitude of its Western partners.⁹

A second, much more serious problem occurred in connection with the restriction of the extent of activities and authority of the Political-Military Commission. According to the Soviet government, this body was to co-ordinate and control the activities of all Allied military and civil institutions constituted on the occupied territory, those which dealt with the questions related to the truce with Italy¹⁰ and the monitor of its compliance. In accordance with this, the Political-Military Commission could, from time to time, issue instructions and regulations not only for the Italian government headed by Pietro Badoglio, but under similar conditions to the governments of other countries that left the Axis. By means of this, the authority of the Commander-in-Chief, General Eisenhower, would be significantly limited only to the influence on the decisions concerning military operations. The United States considered the commission just as an advisory body, which would elaborate materials in the form of recommendations for their governments, while General Eisenhower should not have exclusively controlled military planning, but was to have a full right to decide or potentially improve any decisions concerning the Italian government.¹¹

The British had the same opinion. In the memorandum delivered to both allied governments, they emphasised that the commission would have access to all relevant information but could not make final decisions, having binding effect for Badoglio's government. By means of this, the commission

⁸ *FRUS* 1943, pp. 787–788 and p. 790.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 797 and 562.

¹⁰ The surrender of Italy was publicly announced on 8th September 1943.

¹¹ *The correspondence*, pp. 532 and 755–756.

achieved a purely advisory status.¹² Inter-allied discussion on this topic continued in the following weeks, but negotiations did not bring any concrete results. What is more, in the first meeting, not all of the members of the Political-Military Commission could participate as the Soviet representative, Vyshinsky, could not arrive at Algiers due to his persistent health problems. Finally, the commission did not meet at all, which suited Western powers, trying to diminish the authority of this body to minimum, and therefore the completion of the status of the commission was one of the important goals of the Moscow conference of ministers of foreign affairs of the Big Three.¹³

The ministers approved “creating a mechanism for solving the issues, which require close co-operation, with a specific focus on the activity and extent of the Political-Military Commission in Algiers”¹⁴ as point three on the agenda of the conference. The British Secretary of State, Anthony Eden, during his unofficial meeting with Cordell Hull on 19th October mentioned that he had no objections against extended competences of this commission. He proposed that such an important body should reside in London, while its sub-commission that would focus on the area of the Mediterranean should remain in Algiers.¹⁵ Three days later, during a regular meeting of the conference, Eden materialised his vision and presented a new plan of the procedures regarding the administration of Italy. According to the British proposal, the Allied Control Commission was to be established on the territory of Italy. This would be directly subordinate to the Allied Commander-in-Chief. The second phase comprised the creation of the Consultative Council, in which a Soviet representative would take his position. Its function would be advisory and hierarchically it would come under the Control Commission. This, comprehensibly, meant a significant shift from the originally proposed plan about the operation of the inter-allied control commission. Apart from this, Eden raised a question about to what extent the planned Political-Military Commission would deal with the issues that did not directly concern Italy, but were related to the questions of post-war administration. According to a preliminary agreement the primary task of this body was to judge questions concerning the condition of the truce with Italy, but the committee was to “mutually negotiate further similar problems

¹² *FRUS* 1943, pp. 554–555.

¹³ KUKLICK, B.: *The Genesis*, p. 195. The conference of the ministers of three allied powers was held on 18–30 October 1943. Particular delegations were led by the chiefs of diplomacy – Vyacheslav M. Molotov (U.S.S.R.), Anthony Eden (Great Britain) and Cordell Hull (U.S.A.).

¹⁴ *FRUS* 1943, p. 703.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 570–572.

in the enemy territory liberated by the Allies. The British party perceived the situation that if the committee focused only on Italy it could not deal with another administrative task completely".¹⁶ The British party saw the situation that if the committee would focus only on Italian issues, logically it could not deal with other administrative work. In that moment, Eden repeatedly reminded them of the document written at the British Foreign Office as far as back in July 1943, in which a certain inter-allied tripartite commission, called the Allied Control Commission was mentioned. The British representative therefore suggested the transformation of the Political-Military Commission into the Advisory Council for Italy and at the same time the establishment of a completely new commission. This new institution, called the European Advisory Commission (EAC) was expected to deal with broader tasks than then-current Political Military Commission. According to William Strang,¹⁷ this EAC was expected to function as "an advisory body revealing common European problems concerning war".¹⁸

Eden repeated again that its residence was to be London which housed many exile governments. In the following discussion, he proposed that the commission should prioritise the questions of further procedures against Germany.¹⁹

This British plan, which significantly changed the functioning of the former Political- Military Commission, raised a justifiable suspicion that the U.S.S.R. could be excluded from the game regarding Italy. The reason for this suspicion was that the competences and authorities of the members of the Consultative Council, including the Soviet representative, should be of a recommendatory nature, despite Eden having confirmed the establishment of a new body that would focus exclusively on Italian matters, naturally with U.S.S.R. participation. Similarly, the American Secretary of State, Hull, was not enthusiastic about the British proposal. He worried that a new European commission would support the revival of pre-war policy of dividing spheres of influence, a policy that he objected very much. Hull inclined more to the notion of using new methods of allied trilateral consultations in case a particular problem needs special judgement. According to Hull, in this case, a tripartite committee was necessary to negotiate/hold talks in one of

¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 604–613.

¹⁷ Sir William Strang, a permanent secretary of the Secretary of State of Great Britain and a member of the delegation participating at the Moscow conference; since November 1943 a British representative of the EAC.

¹⁸ KENNAN, George: *Memoirs 1925–1950*. Boston 1967, p. 164.

¹⁹ *FRUS 1943*, pp. 606 and 629; GADDIS, John: *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War 1941–1947*. New York 1972, pp. 105–106.

the capital cities (Washington, London and Moscow – chosen due to a topical need), in the direct participation of the minister of foreign affairs of a host country and permanent diplomatic representatives of two other countries in a particular capital city.²⁰

In the following discussion during the fifth meeting of ministers of foreign affairs Molotov radically demanded that the negotiations should be based on the initial British document from July 1943, which required the existence of both institutions – a tripartite commission for Italy as well as a special commission for questions affecting all of Europe. The Soviet representative would only be content when Eden had ensured him that the Advisory Council for Italy with the Soviet participation would be established as soon as possible. Molotov reconciled with the fact that another commission would be set up in London, although he supported Hull's idea of tripartite negotiations on the basis of existing diplomatic relations.²¹

During the 11th meeting, being held on 29 October, a lively exchange of opinions between Eden and Molotov took place. While the British party pushed ahead with broader competences for the London commission and disproportionately weaker ones for the Advisory Commission for Italy, the Soviet delegation referred again to the July British memorandum and insisted on the originally intended broader jurisdiction of the Advisory Commission. Eden argued that the British party considered the EAC as a suitable basis for creating a long-term allied policy. In the following, last day of the conference, Molotov was made to realise the actual manoeuvring possibilities of the Soviet Union in Italy – an Advisory Council might have been established at once, but its real impact on the influence in the country would have been minimal and was left in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief of the Anglo-American armies in Europe, Eisenhower. Molotov therefore changed his strategy and agreed upon the creation of the EAC provided that its activities would not focus on building the spheres of influence in Europe.²² Hull accepted the British plan after being ensured by Eden that the council would not have executive power under its control and would not decide on the questions of “big politics”.

The ministers of foreign affairs of three allied powers agreed upon the creation of the Advisory Council for Italy, with its residence in Algiers. Its role was to inform particular governments about political issues in the country and elaborate recommendations of political nature for the main

²⁰ FRUS 1943, pp. 756–757.

²¹ Ibid., s. 620–621.

²² KUKLICK, B.: *The Genesis*, p. 198.

allied Commander-in-Chief. Roosevelt tried to attach great significance to this new body, appointing Robert Murphy to be an American representative in the commission.²³ One issue was still open: while the Advisory Council, which was expected to deal with issues with regard to Italy, the membership of the French Committee of National Liberation was taken into account, in the European Advisory Commission, which should pay attention to the issues of general nature and primarily with regard to Germany, the French would not have their representative. Despite the fact that the French Committee of National Liberation led by General Charles de Gaulle considered this decision as a regrettable fact, the attitude of the United States and Great Britain was single-sided, excluding a different opinion on a tripartite nature of a commission.²⁴

In the final phase – in the concluding protocol of the conference held on 1st November 1943 – the foreign ministers agreed upon a compromise-based solution, which took into account the expectations of all three powers. The role of the newly-established European Advisory Commission was seen mainly in studying European issues arising from the gradual termination of military operations, the issues that the Big Three governments would acknowledge purposeful for being submitted to the commission. After a close examination and evaluation of the entrusted problem, the commission was to present a common standpoint to the governments. In accordance with this, all three allied governments obliged themselves to fully support the members of the EAC in providing unnecessary information about important aspects of political and military development, which will concern their work. One of the first goals of the commission was to elaborate detailed plans of the conditions of capitulation which will be assigned to all those countries with which any of the three governments was in war status and to elaborate a mechanism which will ensure its fulfilment. The experiences achieved in making the surrender with Italy were to be an example for this work. In cases when the commission would discuss issues concerning the governments of other countries which fought alongside with the Allies, these governments would be invited to participate in the negotiations. On the other hand, the allied governments kept their sovereignty over the commission work in such a way that they sustained their authority in restricting the competences of the commission if any circumstances, which would require a necessity to get involved in its

²³ MILLER, James: *United States and Italy, 1940–1950: The Politics and Diplomacy of Stabilization*. Chapel Hill 1986, p. 75.

²⁴ During the following year the U.S.A. and Great Britain revised their resolute attitude. *FRUS* 1943, pp. 798–799.

structure or activities, occurred. Apart from this, the American party inserted a clause which did not exclude a contingency that in the following months a variety of questions might have arisen – the question that would need a call for particular international or special tripartite conferences.²⁵

After the Moscow conference of foreign ministers, the actual creation and operation of the EAC were on the programme. Most effort was put in by the British, as the EAC was to be situated in their capital city. The first essential step was to nominate the representatives of single countries. This act revealed how much significance had been awarded to the commission by particular participating governments. Instead of appointing a special authorised representative who would concentrate exclusively on the work in this commission, the U.S.A. delegated their ambassador in London, John Winant. Due to his duties with regard to his function as the chief of the American diplomatic mission in Great Britain, he could be active in the commission only marginally. The same procedure was taken by Moscow that appointed the Soviet ambassador to Great Britain, Fiodor T. Gusev, as a Soviet representative in the EAC. On the other hand, the British appointed one of their brightest officials of the Foreign Office, Sir William Strang,²⁶ provided him with a sufficient number of personnel and space for an adequate performance of this function. In November 1944, liberated France became the fourth full member of the EAC and delegated a very competent diplomat, the then-ambassador in London.

American and Soviet governments tried meticulously to supervise the activities of their representatives in the EAC. Both governments equally insisted on the fact that the final recommendations would not be announced before the governmental bodies of particular government had approved them. This significantly limited the operational possibilities of the commission and the necessary amount of flexibility, which is a must in the activity of such a multilateral advisory body. However, the Soviet party changed their reserved attitude towards the EAC at the beginning of 1944 and, to a certain extent, it adopted the British view on the commission as an allied body dealing with European matters. Nevertheless, the American government – mostly under the influence of military circles (and the president Franklin D. Roosevelt) – did not change its sceptical view on the activities of the EAC during the whole period. It was the main reason that the commission was

²⁵ The Advisory Council for Italy started its operation in Algiers, where at the end of November 1943 the first meeting was held. This body was in operation until March 1946 and 52 meetings took place in total.

²⁶ *FRUS 1943*, pp. 806–807.

eventually made to narrow its sphere of activity and focus almost exclusively on the questions of the post-war control machinery of Germany (and Austria), although due to the resolutions of the Moscow conference the EAC was to study problems arising from the gradual termination of war actions on the European continent, i.e. the solution to the situation on the liberated territory of the allied countries.

Mainly President Roosevelt placed focus on the fact that it was necessary to remain a purely advisory body of the EAC without the right to make decisions. He was worried about repeating the situation from the end of World War I, when various backdoor agreements of single winning powers made the USA withdraw from the European political affairs. He was not interested in developing the impression that the EAC was building a new world order in secret. Roosevelt perfectly confirmed his attitude of refusal towards the commission in his letter from 20th October 1944, addressed to the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull. He appreciated the fact that a lot of issues concerning Germany had been discussed on the grounds of the EAC, but on the other hand, he considered all the activity as early because it was not directly what he considered essential at that time. According to Roosevelt, the discussed plans how to deal with post-war Germany could be postponed “either a week or a month, maybe several months”. He justified by saying he disliked “making detailed plans for a country we do not yet occupy”.²⁷ The President absolutely refused to accept the commitments, latently limiting the freedom of his actions in the issues of post-war organisation of Europe.²⁸ In reality, he preferred that an inter-allied body such as the EAC had never been established.²⁹ Regarding the London commission, he emphasised that the European Advisory Commission was only an advisory body and that neither Hull nor him were bound by its opinion.³⁰

Despite the fact that the commission succeeded in gaining real achievements during its operation (January 1944–September 1945), the most important documents were elaborated and approved during 1944. On the opening meeting of the commission, which was held on 14th January 1944, the British party presented their own project of the capitulation conditions, which

²⁷ *Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers, 1944. General Volume I.* Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966 (further only *FRUS 1944*), pp. 358–359.

²⁸ WHITCOMB, Roger: *The Cold War in Retrospect: The Formative Years.* Westport 1998, p. 28.

²⁹ MAYERS, David: *George Kennan and the Dilemmas of U. S. Foreign Policy.* New York 1988, p. 80.

³⁰ *FRUS 1944*, pp. 358–359.

were expected to be mutually submitted to Germany.³¹ Their own suggestions were gradually presented by the American³² and Soviet³³ delegations, later. During the following negotiations it was shown that the United States had considered an unconditional surrender not only as a definite end of the military status (similarly with the British), but at the same time they found it as the climax of their own military engagement in Europe. On the other hand, the Soviets saw it as definite confirmation of their military victory over fascist Germany. The commission reached a compromise that the final capitulation document would be brief and would contain regulations, mainly of military character. The final written document called the Unconditional Surrender of Germany,³⁴ approved on 25th July 1944, was the first document elaborated and approved on the ground of the EAC. The text of the agreement was slightly modified on 1st May 1945, in connection with the acceptance of France as a full signatory of the capitulation protocol.

At the beginning of 1945, the allies started to speculate whether any central German government would exist, as the case may be whether it would be authorised to sign the capitulation act. The EAC was therefore given the instruction to elaborate a solution concerning this alternative. Acting the most flexibly, the British delegation re-elaborated the original capitulation document into the form of a unilateral declaration, which being announced did not require the presence of the German government. After elaborating the comments, on 12th May 1945 the EAC approved the Declaration regarding the Defeat of Germany and the Assumption of Supreme Authority with respect to Germany, which was officially made public by the main military leaders of four occupational powers on 5th June 1945 in Berlin.³⁵

Another project which was approved was directly connected with the issue of designing the capitulation conditions. The last point of the capitulation

³¹ Ibid., pp. 116–139.

³² Ibid., pp. 104–109 and 167–172.

³³ Ibid., pp. 173–179.

³⁴ Ibid., pp. 256–261.

³⁵ *A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents 1941–1949*. Washington 1985, pp. 273–284. Note: German highest military leadership surrendered unconditionally, but this act was not confirmed in written mode by any representative of the German civilian government. A very similar situation like in 1918 occurred that the truce was signed by the member of the government, but nobody from the general staff, however, this time the situation developed vice versa. Whereas the Allies wanted to avoid possible future conjunctures in regard with the legality/force of the surrender, they decided to solve the situation that they did not acknowledge a new German government and on 23rd May 1945 its head, Karl Dönitz, was imprisoned, which meant the end of his effort to establish and recognise the whole-German government.

document reserved the allied governments an open opportunity of additional proclamation of political, economic and financial regulations, which would be imposed on Germany shortly after the surrender. In connection with the declaration from 5th June 1945, by means of which the main leaders of the four occupational powers would take over sovereign power in the country, the EAC worked out detailed material with regard to a wide scale of measures in the domain of common control of trade, finances, foreign affairs or freedom of movement for people. The text of the Agreement on Certain Additional Requirements to Be Imposed on Germany was approved by the commission on 25th July 1945 and its exact wording was incorporated into the regulations of the Potsdam conference.³⁶

This document adjusted a whole series of matters of common interest of the Allies, while it contained far-reaching measures towards demilitarisation, denazification and democratisation of Germany. Its scope is proved by the fact that it comprised more than 12 pages and contained 13 bigger units divided into 49 detailed articles. Therefore, the document was supplemented by a three-page introduction which explained some more complicated parts. The document was unique, as it was accepted by all of the involved governments as the only document out of many other elaborated and submitted materials of the EAC as a whole. The government of the United States approved it in September 1945, excluding controversial article 38, which concerned the extradition of suspected persons who committed military crimes to the Allies.³⁷

The most important achievement of the EAC activities was to delineate the occupational zones in Germany. The British³⁸ and Soviet³⁹ parties

³⁶ *Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic papers: The Conference of Berlin (the Potsdam Conference), 1945, Volume II.* Washington, D. C. 1960 (further *FRUS 1945, Potsdam*), pp. 1008–1023.

³⁷ Within the meaning of this section, particular German authorities were to ensure the participation of all suspected persons who committed war crimes, including the members of the United Nations who were suspicious of breaking the laws in their home countries and had their positions in the occupational allied administration to be presented at the war tribunal. According to the opinion of the American party, these measures were exclusively in the competence of occupational powers and it belonged to the executive authority of the Control Council in Berlin. *Foreign relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers, 1945. European Advisory Commission, Austria, Germany, Volume III.* Washington, D.C. 1968 (further on *FRUS 1945*), p. 536.

³⁸ The so-called. Attlee' plan. *FRUS 1944*, pp. 150–153; STRANG, William: *Prelude to Potsdam: Reflections on War and Foreign Policy.* In: *International Affairs*, Vol. 46, No. 3 (July 1970), p. 450.

³⁹ *FRUS 1944*, pp. 177–178.

presented their ideas at the beginning of 1944, while the American delegation was able to present a qualified suggestion only several months later due to their extraordinary military bureaucracy.⁴⁰ After months of negotiations, on 12 September 1944, a preliminary agreement was approved and the Protocol on the Zones of Occupation in Germany and the Administration of Great Berlin was signed on the EAC ground. The document demarcated the borders of particular zones, on the other hand, it did not state which of the western powers would govern the north-western, or more precisely the south-western zones of Germany. At the same time the question regarding the control of the occupational sectors of Berlin remained unsolved. This unclearness was not the fault of the commission, as it was caused by Roosevelt's unyielding and ill-considered insistence on taking over the north-western occupational zone despite the fact that all long-term military plans of the Allies anticipated that the United States would govern the south-western part of Germany. Two months later, on 14th November 1944, a supplement to the protocol that determined that the north-western zone of Germany as well as the northern sector of Berlin would be governed by Great Britain and a south-western occupational zone together with the southern sector of Berlin would be governed by the U.S.A. was approved. Roosevelt accepted this agreement only when Churchill had guaranteed that the Americans would control the ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven, lying deeply in the British occupational zone.⁴¹ However, this was not the last change, as the Yalta conference decided to single out a separate zone for France. This zone was to be formed by singling out a part from the American and British occupational zones. On the basis of this regulation, the EAC re-elaborated the document and on 26th July 1945 approved the document that demarcated new borders of the western occupation zones and enabled France to participate in governing Berlin. However, the boundaries of the French occupational sector were not defined in detail. It was later done by the Control Council by the delimitation of two Berlin districts out from the British administration.

⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 195–197.

⁴¹ During the next months, it was shown that the jurisdiction of the Bremen enclave separated from its natural economic and administrative connections and located hundreds of kilometres far from the American zone in the south-western Germany was unpractical and useless for the United States. A little bit more than one year from its origin, the whole region of conflict was transferred under the administration of the British occupational zone on 10th December 1945. ZIEMKE, Earl, F.: *The U. S. Army in The Occupation of Germany 1944–1946*. Washington 1975, pp. 124–126.

The last important issue concerning Germany was the question of forming the system of control in the occupational country. Despite the fact that the allied powers were not able to agree upon a common principle of treating a defeated Germany during the whole year of 1944, the EAC elaborated and approved the Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany on 14th November 1944. According to the document, the commanders of the armed forces of the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A. and Great Britain were expected to exercise authority in consistence with the guidelines of their governments. Regarding Germany's issues as a country, they were to advance together as members of the highest allied body – The Control Council, whose role was to elaborate guidelines regarding military, political and economic issues at the same time when the primary conditions of unconditional surrender were to be applied in the country. The wording of this document as well as an agreement on the surrender conditions were modified on 1st May 1945.⁴²

The solution concerning the German issue was closely connected with the post-war destiny of Austria as this country was an integral part of the Third Reich during World War II. With regards to the regulations of the Moscow conference, the Allies came to the conclusion that Austria as “the first free country that became a victim of the Nazi aggression was liberated from German dominance.” The allied powers considered the annexation of Austria by Hitler Germany on 13th March 1938 as invalid and did not feel to be bound by any changes, carried out in Austria after this date, as it was attached to the Third Reich before World War II broke out and the country as an independent country was not in war status with the U.S.A., Great Britain and the U.S.S.R.⁴³ In their declaration, however, the ministers reminded Austria that due to their co-participation alongside Germany in war, it would bear the responsibility and that in final reckoning of accounts the Allies would take into consideration their participation in their country's liberation.⁴⁴ The commission was sent a clear message that the plan concerning post-war administration of Austria was to be elaborated differently from that related to Germany.

In the EAC, the negotiations regarding the Austrian issue were conducted from the beginning of 1944, but culminated in the spring and summer of the following year, when the commission approved the document Agreement on Control Machinery in Austria on 4th July 1945. Unlike Germany, where

⁴² *FRUS 1944*, pp. 404–406.

⁴³ KEYSERLINGK, Robert: *Austria in World War II: An Anglo-American Dilemma*. Kingston 1988, p. 152.

⁴⁴ *FRUS 1943*, p. 761; *A Decade of American*, p. 13.

the Allies tried to decentralise the country, the procedures in Austria were different, to keep unity between relatively small provinces. Although a newly-established allied commission was derived from the model of the Allied Control Commission in Germany, its main role was to ensure a separation of an Austrian administration from a German one. The authority of the Allied Commission was clearly defined as it was expected to function until a new Austrian government was established, formed due to the results of free parliamentary elections.⁴⁵

After a couple of days – 9th July 1945 – the EAC gave final shape to the division of the occupational zones in Austria and at the same time it approved a mechanism of the occupational administration of the city of Vienna. In a sense of the Agreement on Zones of Occupation in Austria and the Administration of the City of Vienna, Austria was divided into four occupational zones, respecting the intra-territorial boundaries between the provinces, which were in force from 1st October 1938. The north-eastern occupational zone devolved upon the Soviet Union, the Americans occupied a north-western zone, the British a southern zone and the French were expected to administer the provinces of Tirol and Vorarlberg. Similarly, Vienna was divided into four occupational sectors, but in contrast with the whole-country zones, the division was based on the state by 31st December 1937. The only exception was the city centre (Innere Stadt), which was occupied by all four allied armies.⁴⁶ The whole city was administered by a combined body called the Kommandatura, consisting of four commanders of winning powers.⁴⁷

In total, during its existence the EAC held 20 official and 97 informal meetings, while the final documents were submitted and approved in two big Allied conferences, held in 1945.⁴⁸ From the original British idea that the commission would substantially function as an independent group of advisors, dealing with topical European problems and approving common recommendations of particular governments not a lot left in reality. This reality resulted from the fact that while the Soviet, but mainly British representative in the commission had a sufficient supply of information and instructions from their home countries, the American delegate suffered

⁴⁵ FRUS 1945, *Potsdam*, pp. 351–355.

⁴⁶ ERICKSON, Edgar: *The Zoning of Austria*. In: *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 267, Military Government (Jan. 1950) p. 113.

⁴⁷ FRUS 1945, pp. 158–159.

⁴⁸ MANÁK, Marián: *Európska poradná komisia a diplomacia USA v rokoch 1943–1945. (The European Advisory Commission and the diplomacy of the USA 1943–1945)*. Krakov 2011.

from a lack of relevant material for negotiations, more precisely, by time delay which caused the materials to become out of date. Therefore Winant was too frequently only in the position of a commentator of the carefully prepared British, or rather Soviet proposals. The problem of the American delegation in the EAC was based on a lack of common approach to foreign politics between President Roosevelt and the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull. Hull could repeatedly find out that in many vitally important issues referring to American foreign politics he was not informed at all. He was responsible only for the decisions that were from time to time directly submitted by the President. He even dealt with the questions he was not sufficiently familiar with. Naturally, it had a negative impact on strategic planning for the whole allied machinery.

The termination of the commission was decided by the representatives of the three powers at the Potsdam Conference on 2nd August 1945, based on the fact that the coordination of common policy in Germany and Austria was taken over by particular authorities. A new allied body – the Council of Foreign Ministers – was established. In their regulation, they expressed satisfaction with commission work and stated that the EAC had successfully met the challenge submitted by single governments to be judged. The worsening relations between western allies and the Soviet Union caused that the final report of the commission was not approved in the last regular meeting on 6th September 1945, but was not confirmed until January 1946 by certain representatives' additional written consent with its contents.⁴⁹ Nothing could change the fact that as a result the documents elaborated on the ground of the EAC significantly influenced the further development of Europe as a whole for several decades.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ *FRUS 1945*, pp. 539–544.

⁵⁰ The study was carried out within the grant project of the Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Sport of the Slovak Republic VEGA 1/0687/15 *Western Powers (France and the United States of America) and Czechoslovakia in the first half of the 20th century. Západné veľmoci (Francúzsko a Spojené štáty americké) a Československo v 1. polovici 20. storočia*.

SUMMARY

*FORMATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE ALLIED BODY –
EUROPEAN ADVISORY COMMISSION IN 1943–1945.
(BRIEF SURVEY BASED ON THE UNITED STATES' ARCHIVE DOCUMENTS)*

The advance of military operations of the Allies in 1943 and the expected defeat of the Axis states started more and more urgently to recognise a necessity of establishing a mechanism that would ensure a closer co-operation between the U.S.A, the U.S.S.R and Great Britain in solving European issues, resulting from the war development. First, the Allies focussed on solving the most topical issue of the time – the expected capitulation of Italy. The powers agreed upon the establishment of the Political-Military Commission, but the members of this body did not meet at all. It was only at the conference of the ministers of foreign affairs of the Big Three in autumn 1943 when the Consultative Committee for Italy was established and so was the European Advisory Commission. The ministers saw its role mainly in studying European problems resulted from the gradual termination of military actions and recognised by the Big Three as purposeful to be submitted to the commission that would review the situation and elaborate a common stance. The first meeting of the commission was held on 14th January 1944, the last one on 6th September 1945. The committee elaborated a proposal regarding capitulation conditions, which were to be submitted to Germany by the Allies, and it drew up the structure of an additional control mechanism that would enable to check whether Germany met the requirements and stipulated the occupational zones for particular allied powers in the country. The commission elaborated similar materials regarding the post-war administration of Austria. A number of documents elaborated on its grounds were submitted and approved at the two big Allied conferences, held in Yalta and Potsdam in 1945.

Key words: European Advisory Commission, World War II, diplomacy

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